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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
11 & S CONSTRUCTION & 
:D~NUTNEERING COMPANY 
-vs-
' 
Plaintiff, 
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, 
Defendant, 
VERN l\L SMITH, et al., 
Additional Defendants. 
Case No. 
10708 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff's action was for damages against the Bank 
at Clearfield upon two grounds: (a) breach of agree-
rnm t to extend financing assistance to the extent of 
$50,000 on a continuing or revolving line of credit basis, 
as required by plaintiff, to take care of payrolls and 
op0rating costs pending receipt of payments from the 
primp contractor on the basis of monthly estimates; and 
( h) damages for improper appropriation by the Bank 
of fund:-; belonging to plaintiff, received by the Bank in 
1 rni-;t subject to prior payment of all debts for labor and 
li .. n:ihk obligations of plaintiff. 
1 
DI8POSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury on the first cause 
of action on special interrogatories (R. 87) as to (a) 
whether such an agreement was made by the Bank; 
and (b) whether the Bank breached the agreement. Both 
interrogatories were answered by the jury in the affirm-
ative. 
Thereafter, the jury was requested to assess the 
damages suffered by plaintiff on the basis of instructions 
given by the Court as to the elements to be considered 
in fixing damages for breach of contract. (R. 88-91). 
The jury then rendered its verdict fixing plaintiff's dam-
ages in the sum of $156,000.00. (R. 95) 
Issues pertaining to the second cause of action were 
not submitted to the jury, but were reserved for deter-
mination by the Court as a matter of law on the basis 
of the uncontradicted evidence; the Trial Court having 
theretofore determined that the measure of damages 
would be the same in the second cause of action as in the 
first, since the result to plaintiff was the same, namely 
forfeiture of its contract rights under the Steenberg 
contract. 
Thereafter, defendant Bank filed its motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 97-99) which 
was granted by the Trial Court upon two grounds: that 
the contract for financing was unenforcable because it 
was in violation of the Statute of Frauds, as one which 
was not to he 1wrfonned within one year; and that the 
fund represenkd hy the $38,862.54 check from Steenberg 
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was not received by the Bank in trust as a special deposit 
or deposit for a special purpose, and hence that is was 
available to the Bank for its appropriation and applica-
tion as it saw fit. (R. 108-112). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the verdict of the jury re-
instated and the final judgment entered thereon, or in 
the alternative that the judgment be entered as a matter 
of law on the second cause of action on the basis of the 
uncontradicted evidence. Plaintiff and Additional De-
fendant Vern M. Smith seek to be relieved from affirm-
ative judgments entered against them on several notes. 
STATEMENT OF FAJCTS 
Steenberg Construction 1Company had a general con-
tract to construct the Lost Creek Dam for the Bureau 
of Reclamation on the Weber Basin Project. Steenberg, 
in turn, made a subcontract dated June 17, 1963, with 
plaintiff M & S Construction Company for digging the 
eore trench portion of the job (Exhibits A and I) with 
the usual provisions for monthly payments to be made by 
8teenberg to M & S on the basis of monthly estimates 
as to value of labor performed and materials furnished, 
remittance to be made to M & S by Steenberg from money 
rt>eeived from the Bureau, less 10% to be retained by 
St<>enberg until final completion of the subcontract. 
Tlw subcontract also contained provisions requiring 
~I & S to pay all costs of labor and materials as the same 
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became due and to save Steenberg harmless for all claims 
and mechanics' liens on account thereof, and to furnish 
~teenberg as and when reqiiested satisfactory evidence 
tha·t i1I & S had complie.d with such payment obligation:-;. 
The subcontract further provided that if M & S shall 
default in performance of the contract, Steenberg shall 
have the right to take over the job, have full access to 
and use of all equipment in the care, custody and control 
of M & S, and to take over and complete the contract 
itself (see paragraphs I (a), V, XII, and paragraplu; 1 
( d) of the agreement of the contractor on page 2 of 
Exhibits A and I.) 
ln general business practice such contracts call for 
financial assistance by the contractor to carry payrolls 
and obligations and to pay installment payments on 
equipment and materials until the receipt of monthly 
l'stimate pa)·uwnts ( T. 66, Sl, 82), particularly in the 
c->arly stages of the job. ( T. 66, Sl, 82) M & S and its 
principal stockholders were depositors with defendant 
Bank so the Bank, through its Executive Vice President, 
l\Ir. Jesse D. Barlow, solicited the business of furnishing 
this financial sPrvice to M & S. (T. 23, 2-!) At first, M & ~ 
did not feel that it would need such assistance, because it 
had practically completed two jobs, one at Dug·way 
Proving Grnunds and another at Cedar Cit)r Airport, 
from whid1 it was about to receive final payment; but 
early in August, 19G3, 1\1 & S accepted the invitation of 
Mr. Barlow for the Bank to furnish this assistance on 
thP Bank's financial plan for a revolving or continuing 
line of ('redit er. 80, 82, 113, 114). This arrangement was 
('(msummatPd on or about August 2~, 1963. The limit of 
nedit was first set at $25,000.00, and then raised to 
$G0,000.00, to be utilized as needed, and effectuated by 
tlw making and renewal of short-term notes to cover 
payroll checks and other lienable expenditures, in accord-
anL'e with a pattern described by Mr. Barlow of the Bank, 
and as found by the !Court and jury to be true as alleged 
hy plaintiff (T. 87). Before making this agreement, 
however, the Bank requested and received a copy of the 
;\I & S contract with Steenberg, submitted the same to 
it::; counsel, and discussed the merits of the agreement 
with l\Ir. Walsh, Steenberg's vice president (T. 66). 
To secure the defendant Bank against loss, the Bank 
had its counsel prepare an assignment of all funds due 
or to become due to M & S from Steenberg under the 
subcontract, totaling an estimated $754,579.00, .a·s col-
lateral security for all loans made and to be made by 
tl1e Rallk to 1\1 & S, (see Exhibit B) which assignment 
\\'as executed by .M & S, notarized by Mr. Barlow, and 
t hell transmitted by the Bank to Steenberg for accept-
nnee, which was done on August 23, 1963. 
The defendant Bank thereafter, as additional secur-
i t:<, also took similar assignments of all funds due 
and to become due to M & S on the jobs at Cedar City 
( $30,000.00), and at Dugway ($5,000.00) (T. 15, 17, 183), 
in addition to chattel mortgages on the interest of M & S 
in various equipment then owned or being purchased by 
~I & ~. 
'l'h<' financing arrangement was performed accord-
ing to agreement during September, 1963. Payroll checks 
\\"I'(• dravYn and honored as presented, and short-term 
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loans were made and a note was renewed as agreed. The 
September estimate for work done during August was 
duly received Ly check made payable to the Bank and 
M & S, with an endorsement on the back of the check to 
be signed by both that all obligations for labor and ma-
terials had been paid (see the reverse side of Exhibit G) 
and <luring this period l\I & S continued to issue its pay-
roll checks to its employees which were duly honored by 
the Bank. This was in accordance with the pattern estab-
lished as a part of the financing agreement for the re-
vob;ing or continuing credit between the Bank and M & S 
as described by Mr. Barlow, with the understanding that 
all such checks were to be countersigned by Mr. Claire 
A. Niehmn, an accountant acceptable to the Bank. (T. 
62, 63, 128). 
The October payment from Steenberg for work done 
during September, 1963, was delayed in arrival for rea-
sons that arf' not material to this appeal, so the defendant 
Bank, through its Executive Vice President, .Mr. Jesse 
Barlow, personally undertook the job of obtaining the 
money from Steenberg; made Jong distance phone calls 
to Mr. Walsh of 8teenberg to find out why the delay, and 
Mr. Walsh explained to him that the Government had not 
transmitted funds as promptly as usual because of a 
change in location of the accounting office (Exhibit H); 
but finally, on October 23, 1963, a check for $38,862.54 
from Steenberg, made payable to .M & S and the Bank, 
arrived, with an endorsement on the reverse side to be 
signed by both M & S and Mr. Barlow for the Bank, as 
set forth nrhatirn i11 011r discussio11 under Point II. This 
check was accompanied by a lettPr of transmittal signed 
(j 
liy Steenberg addressed to the defendant Bank, also 
Rct forth verbatim in our discussion of Point IL 
In the meantime, these payroll checks on the Lost 
Creek job had been given to laborers in accordance with 
the Agreement, and the same had been permitted to ac-
eumnlate in the Bank. (T.128). 
The letter of transmittal from Steenberg, with the 
check, arrived at the post office at Clearfield, Utah, in 
the evening, after the close of business, but Mr. Barlow, 
not content to wait until the morrow, got the postmaster 
to go down to the post office to get it out, called Mr. 
Mendenhall of M & S to come over and endorse the check, 
arnl then had an officer of an Ogden bank, its correspon-
dent, put its stamp on the check following an endorse-
ment by Mr. Mendenhall of M & S and the endorsement 
hy defendant Bank; and then the Ogden bank officer 
personally took the check to the airport in Salt Lake 
that same night for mailing to St. Paul, Minn., for pay-
ment. It was during this time, while the Bank was waiting 
for the check to clear that M & S became fearful that the 
Hauk might not honor its financing agreement, so it had 
its attorney, Mr. Pritchett, call on Mr. Barlow at the 
Bank to urge the Bank to adhere to its financing agree-
ment. (T. 89, 90) Mr. Barlow requested Mr. Pritchett 
not to communicate to Steenberg any intimation of trouble 
lwtwePn the Bank and M & S until after the check had 
<·]pared. Then, ·when Mr. Barlow had been advised per-
sonally by Mr. Walsh of Steenberg over long distance 
phone that the check had cleared, he called Mr. Stoker 
of T\l & S into the Bank and then for the first and final 
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time directed that all payroll ehecks of M & S on the Lost 
Creek job were to be dishonored, payment refused, (T. 
127, 131), and directed that the amount of the check be 
credited to ohligatio11s of 11 & S to the Bank and its of-
ficers exeepting only a small amount, one of which obliga-
tions so paid was not yet due, including also a $2,000.00 
note owned by .Mr. Barlow and Mr. Steed personally, and 
one note subject to the renewal agreement. 
The result was of course that Steenberg immediately 
defaulted M & S on the job, made arrangements to pick 
up the outstanding payroll checks, took over all equip-
ment, and M & S lost not only its investment in the job 
amounting to $100,129.91 (Exhibit N), but also its antici-
pated profit; all as found by the verdict of the jury to be 
in the sum of $156,000.00. (T. 129, 134) 
The jury found for 1.1 & S on all issues on the basis 
of the Trial Court's instructions as to the issues on the 
first cause of action and as to the measure of damages. 
The rrrial Court then, upon motion of the defendant 
bank, considered the Bank's motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, which was thereafter granted 
on July 12, 1%6 upo11 the following grounds: 
1. That the financing contract for revolving credit 
lJetween 1\[ & S and the Hank was invalid because it was 
barred by the Statute of Frauds as contemplating action 
not to be p<~rforrnPd ·within one year; and 
2. That the evidence did not show that the deposit 
of $38,8()2.54 rpceiv<~d by the Bank from Steenberg on 
October :23, 1 Uii:3, \\'a~ received in trust as a deposit for 
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special purpose, namely to pay for labor and materials 
on the job; and hence was available to the Bank for its 
appropriation. 
This appeal is from the order and judgment of the 
Trial Court in making and entering that judgment not-
wi t hstaucling the verdict of the jury. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE AGREEMENT UPON WHICH APPELLANT 
BASED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND WHICH 
AGREEMENT WAS FOUND BY THE JURY IN 
ANSWER TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY TO HAVE 
EXISTED IN FACT, WAS BARRED BY THE PROVI-
SIONS OF 25-5-4 (1) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, IN THAT SAID AGREEMENT BY ITS TERMS 
WAS NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR 
FROM THE MAKING THEREOF. 
During the course of this lawsuit there has been 
mention of several contracts, subcontracts and agree-
ments. \;Ve are presently concerned with one and only 
one of these, namely the Bank's agreement to finance 
M & S on the Lost Creek Dam Project, as alleged in 
appellant's second cause of action. There is no question 
as to whether or not such Agreement did in fact exist 
for such was resolved in the affirmative by the jury's 
answer to Special Interrogatories. The question remains 
to be resolved by this Court as to whether or not such 
Agreement is enforcible under the provisions of the 
lTtah Statute of Frauds found at 25-5-4 (1) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which reads as follows: 
In the following cases every agreement shall 
be void unless such agreement or some note or 
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memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is 
not to be performed within one year 
from the making thereof. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
***** 
***** 
***** 
The nature of the Agreement was such that the 
Bank agreed and promised to lend to M & S, as and 
when required by M & S, for the pUirpose of providing 
finances to carry on its work under the terms and pro-
visions of the subcontract between M & S and Steen-
herg Construction Company, certain sums of money and 
to renew such loans from time to time to the date of 
final payment by Steenberg Construction Company (T. 
87). M & S contfmds that there is nothing within the 
terms of the subcontract referred to which by the terms 
thereof negate the possibility of performance within one 
year from the making of the agreement to loan money. 
Such factor is extremely significant as will appear from 
an analysis of the authorities on this subject. 
In discnsHing this point of law 2 Corbin on Contracts 
534 states at Section 444: 
... In its actual application ... the courts have 
bf~Em perhaps even less friendly to this provision 
than to the other provisions of the Statute. They 
have obSPfVPd the Pxaet words on this provision 
and haw inkrpreted thPm literally and very nar-
ro\\'l~v .... In gprn•ral the easPs in<licate that there 
lO 
must not be the slightest possibility that it (the 
Agreement) can be fully performed within one 
year. 
It makes no difference how long the agreed 
perfo~ma!1ce ma! be delayed, or over how long 
a period it may m fact be continued. It makes no 
difference how long the parties expect the per-
formance to take or how reasonable and accurate 
those expectations are, if the agreed performance 
can possibly be completed within a year. Facts 
like these do not bring a contract within the 
StatUJte. A provision in the contract fixing a 
maximum period within which performance is 
to be completed, even though that period is much 
in excess of one year, does not make the Statute 
applicable. A building contract is frequently such 
that it can be fully performed within one year. If 
so, it is not within the one year clause however 
long the parties may expect to take or actually 
do take. 
In the subcontract ref erred to above there was a 
fixed time limit within which such contract had to be 
performed, however, there was no provision which in 
any way could have been construed to negate the possi-
hility of performance within one year. 
Iu Granvold v. Whaley, 39 Wash. 2d 710, 237 P.2d 
1026, the Supreme Court of Washington held that where 
a performance of a certain agreement was not possible 
until a certain dam was completed, that the fact that the 
da1n could have been completed within one year, but 
wa:,; not expected to be and was not in fact completed for 
thn•e years, did not place the agreement within the pur-
vie1v of the Statute. In reaching this conclusion, the 
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Court referred to 2 Corbin on Contracts 541, Section 
445 as follows: 
A certain performance that would not in 
itself take a year to complete may be promised 
at a definite future date more than one year from 
the time of making the Contract. Such a Contract 
is within the Statute. But if such a performance 
is promised at an uncertain time to be deter-
mined by the happening of a condition that may 
possibly occur within one year, the promise can-
not be said to be one that is not to be perfonned 
within one year and it is not within the one year 
clause of the Statute. It makes no difference how 
improbable it is that the condition will occur with-
in a year; if there is any possibility that it may 
so happen, the statutory provision is not appli-
cable. Nor does it make any difference that the 
condition is one that may never happen at all. 
A like result was reached in M cClanahan i-. Otto-
M armet Co., 74 W. Va. 543, 82 S.E. 752 wherein the 
Court held that a contract to cut the timber on certain 
tracts of land and deliver it as ties and posts was not 
within the Statute, evr11 though the employee expected 
when he undertook the vv·ork that it would require six 
years to complete. The court said: "It can only be said 
that it was not likely to be performed, nor expected by 
plaintiff to be performed within a year. This \\·as held 
in Kimmins 1'. Oldhum, 27 W. Va. 259, not to bring an 
agreement within the Statute." 
The Supreme Court of the United States considered 
this section of the Statute of Frauds in the leading case 
of Warner r. '/'r;ros and J>acific R. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 41 
L.Ed. 495, J7 S. Ct. H 7. I 11 m1 <·xha usfo·e opinio11, the 
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Court ::>ta ted that "the question is not what the prob-
able or expected or actual performance of the contra.ct 
was, hnt whether the contract according to the reasonable 
i11terpreta tion of its terms required that it should not be 
performed tcithin a year." (Emphasis added). As stated 
aboYe, there is no indication that performance by the par-
ties "·as required not to be performed within one year. 
;3 \Villiston on Contracts, 3rd Ed. 575 is in accord with 
thP views expressed above and states at Section 495: 
It is well settled that oral contracts inval-
idated by the Statute because not to be performed 
within a year include those only which cannot be 
performed within that period. 
'l'he interpretation of this provision of the Statute 
of Fra mls is summed up in 49 Am. J ur. 383, Statute of 
Frnuds, Rection 23 wherein it is stated that "to bring a 
1·aHe \Yithin the Statute there must be a negation of the 
ri.r7ld to 1;erform within one yea.r." "In other words, that 
<l contract cannot be performed within a year means not 
a natural or physical impossibility, but an impossibility 
by th<' terms of the contract itself ... " (Emphasis 
added) 
The foregoing has been intended as a general sur-
w·y of the law on this subject, which survey supports 
the proposition that enforcement of the Agreement 
fnnnd hy the jury is not barred by the Statute of Frauds, 
in tliat there was nothing in the terms of said Agree-
tnPnt or within the terms of the subcontract upon which 
s1wh Agreement is in part dependent, which in any way 
lwgat<' the possibility of performance or the right to 
13 
perform within 01w yPar. ln the absence of such re-
strirtion within the terms of the Agreement or Sub-
contract, the Statute is not applicable and the enforce-
ment thereof must not be hampered by the Statute. 
The Rupreme Court of Utah, chose to place itself 
within the main stream of judicial thought on this point 
in Zion's Service Corporation v. Danielson, 12 U. 2d 
369, 366 P.2d 982, wherein the 1Court stated at column 
1, page 985: 
"vVhere the agreement can be performed 
within one year, though this be done by election 
of one of the pnrties to terminate, there can be no 
doubt but that the Statute of Frauds is not ap-
plicable. We agree with the following statement 
from the RPstatement of Contracts and believe 
it determinative of this question: 
'The words "cannot be fully performed" 
must be taken literally. The fact that per-
fonnance within a year is entirely im-
probable or not expected by the parties, 
does not bring the contract within this 
Statntt>.' (Rec. 198, Comment b.) 
"ln Johnson V8. Johnson, 31 Utah -108, 88 P. 
230, we ruled that a contract by a purchaser of 
land to pay the sdler 'for life, one-half of the 
rrops produced on the lands' was not within the 
ahovP provision since death might occur within 
one yPar. The right to terminate a contract at any 
tinie. is likewise such an event as may occur within 
a. year and hrnce the statide does not apply." 
(All t>rnphasis added.) 
The position that the Bank urged upon the trial 
court has hePn <'learl,v rPjPct<>d b>T this Court in a rrcent 
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decision involving an identical financial arrangement 
and an identical factual situation to the case at bar. This 
Court has clearly held that under these circumstances 
the 8tatute of Frauds provision as to performance with-
m one year is not applicable. 
In that case, Commercial Security Book v. Hodson, 
15 U.2d 388, 393 P.2d 482, this Court stated: 
"The exact length of time that this loan 
should last is not specified, but there is nothing 
in the evidence which indicates that the loan 
should not terminate in less than a year." 
In the case before the Court it was not stated exactly 
how long the revolving credit agreement would last, ex-
cept that the loans would be made as and when required 
by 1\1 & S to date of final payment from Steenberg. 
It is significant to note that pursuant to the terms 
of the Agreement loans were to be made "as and when 
l'P< iuired" by M & S and under such arrangement the 
Agreement could have been terminated at any time by 
M & S upon finding that it had no need for further loans. 
It is not uncommon for construction companies to re-
quire financing during the initial stages of a contract 
and then become able to function without financing dur-
ing the final stages of construction when the heavy and 
<>xpensive work has been completed. ('I'. 66, 82, 114) 
l~nd<'l' these circumstances and in light of this 1Court's 
holding in Zion's Service Corporation v. DO!tlielsori, 
:,;upra, and Commercial Secitrity Bank v. Hodson, supra, 
t lie Statute of Frauds is not applicable here since M & S 
<'0111<1 have terminated the Agreement at any time within 
one year. 
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As previously stated, there is nothing in the evi-
dence, Agreement or Subcontract which precludes the 
possibility of performance and hence, the final payment 
from Steenberg all within one year and although per-
formance within that time may have been deemed im-
probable, such was not sufficient reason to bring the 
transaction within the purview of the Statute. 
In view of the facts as disclosed by the record and 
the eminent authorities cited herein, the District Court 
erred in applying the Statute of Frauds in such a manner 
as to preclude the enforcement of the Agreement found 
by the jury to have existed as alleged in appellant's 
second cause of action. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, THE $38,852.54 CHECK WAS 
SUBJECT TO SET OFF AND APPROPRIATION BY 
THE BANK. THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE 
SHOWED IT TO BE HELD BY THE BANK IN 
TRUST AS A SPECIAL DEPOSIT ON DEPOSIT FOR 
SPECIAL PURPOSES, OF WHICH THE BANK HAD 
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD 
HA VE BEEN ENTERED FOR M & S ON THIS BASIS, 
REGARDLESS OF THE RESULT AS TO THE FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Thf• facts with reference to this phase of the case are 
relativPly simple, almost entirely in writing, and leave no 
doubt as to tlw liability of thP Bank for the natural re-
sults of its ~J'tl..et-. a:t-.1Puc.T, 
The assignmPnt (Exhibit B) by which defendant ac-
quired its right to r<'rt>ivt> these monthly payments, clear-
ly and plainly states the relationship of the Bank to the 
fund, viz: as the agent of M & S , with autlwrity to en-
dorse the checks on their behalf; and that it (the Bank) 
receives the same as collateral security for loans made 
and t.o be nwde by the Bwnk to M & Sand as collateral 
security for any and all liabilities due or to become due 
from M & S to the Bank. 
Payment for the September estimate was made by 
check dated October 22, 1963, and received by the Bank 
under the circumstances in the most unusual manner 
described in the statement of facts. The letter of trans-
mittal from Steenberg and the endorsement on the check 
to be signed by the Bank and M & S are as follows: 
"October 22, 1963 
AIH MAIL-SPECIAL DELIVERY 
Clearfield State Bank 
Clearfield, Utah 
Attn: "Mr. Jesse Barlow, Executive Vice President 
Re: M & S Construction & Engineering Co. 
Lost Creek Dam, Weber Basin Project 
Ftah, Spec. No. DC-5935 
0Pntlernen : 
In line with our conversation of this date, we are 
(•nelm;ing herewith our check in the amount of $38,862.54 
in pa,nuent of the September Estimate due Th~ & S Con-
~trndion & F_Jngineering Co. on the above proJect. 
Tnasrnuch as we will have to depend upon one an-
lltlwr on this dt>al, we are looking to you to ascertain from 
l\f r. Claire Nielson, Auditor for M & S, that these fun~s 
nrP heing used to keep their accounts current on this 
prnjP<'L 
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We greatly appn~ciah; your help on keeping us ad-
vised with any new information or developments around 
our sub-contractor, M & S, and we ask that you keep any 
convenmtions or <·orrcspond('nce confidential on this mat-
ter. 
With kindest penional rl:'gards, 
Sincerl:'ly, 
EEvV/het 
STEI!JNBJ<JRG ·CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY 
By /s/ Emil E. Walsh 
Emil I~. ·w alsh, Vice President 
enclosure-check" 
Endorsement on check: 
"ln consideration of this check and the en-
dorsement thereof, we hereby certify that we 
have paid all labor, material, equipment, etc., used 
on the Weber Ba:;;in Project, and do hereby waive 
all rights to assert claims against Steenberg Con-
struction Co., its sur·l:'ty and the owner up to and 
including Sep. 19G3, except for the retained per-
centagc->, if any, as sPt forth in our contract." 
M & S Const. Engr. Co. 
By /s/ James H. Mendenhall 
Vice-President & Treasurer 
Clearfield State Bank 
By /s/ Jesse D. Barlow 
Exect. V. P. 
(jl<>arfi<·<l Ntate Bank 
Cl(·arfiP1<1, l Hah 
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Under these undisputed facts, regardless of whether 
there was or was not an agreement with the Bank to 
extend to M & S this revolving or continuing line of 
credit under the pattern described by Mr. Barlow (R. 
221, 222) the Bank never had such a relationship to the 
proceeds of this $38,862.54 check as to give it (the Bank) 
the right to appropriate it to the payment of its obliga-
tions and to payment of notes held by its officers when it 
then had in its possession payroll checks issued by M & S 
as ref erred to in the letter and endorsement; and with 
the full knowledge of the fact that by so doing it would 
not only violate the trust relationship as to the fund set 
forth in the letter and on the check itself, but also would 
cause an irreparable breach in the Steenberg contract 
with M & S, and give Steenberg the right to declare de-
fault and take over the job. 
In the first place, neither the Bank nor M & S, under 
the Steenberg contract, had the right to demand or re-
ceive the fund, unless payrolls had been paid and lien-
able obligations discharged. The Bank, as assignee of 
the fund, had no better right to the money than M & S. 
The Steenberg contract expressly so states. It even goes 
further, and gives Steenberg the right to demand proof 
of such fact before payment is made, which is exactly 
what it did. The requirements set forth in the Steenberg 
letter (Exhibit I), and on the reverse side of both checks 
( I~xhibits G and H) were within the contract right of 
8 t<·en berg. 
Tho fund belonged to M & S, subject only to the 
prior right of Steenberg to require proof of payment of 
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payrolls and prior application as above set forth; and 
subject also to the right of the Bank, as agent of M & S 
to receive it and hold for M & S as collateral security 
for loans made and to be nia<de. 
From these undisputed facts, the law clearly imposes 
upon this fund the status of a trust relationship, a special 
deposit or a deposit for a special purpose, well-known in 
the law, not a general one which may be subject to off-
set or appropriation by the Bank. It surely requires no 
citation of authorities to this Court to establish the fact 
that funds received as agent and held as collateral, as 
recited in the assignment itself are received and held un-
der a trust relationship as to those funds, regardless of 
what other relationship may exist between the parties 
as to other funds. But the letter transmitting the fund 
and the endorsement on tlw reverse side of the check 
leave no doubt as to its being a special deposit, or deposit 
for a ;:.;pecial purpose relationship between the parties 
as to this particular fund. 
A bank has the right of appropriation and set-off as 
to funds held in a gt•neral account where the relationship 
is that of debtor and creditor-not that of trustee and 
cPstui que trust. 
rt1his would b1~ true regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of the continuing or revolving line of credit agree-
ment. Jt would lw doubly true if, as stated in the assign-
ment itself, thP Cunds to be n·ceived under the assignment 
arP to lw n•t·Piwd hy the Bank as agent and held as col-
lateral for loans lo lie made in the future, as clearly set 
forth in the assigmt11·nt and, as established by the evi-
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dPnt·e, to consist of a continuing relationship as needed 
under the subcontract with Steenberg. 
The authorities are overwhehningly and almost uni-
formly against the right of the Bank to do what it did in 
disregarding and violating its agreement with M & S, and 
in appropriating to itself funds entrusted to it under this 
condition of trust. The Bank had the right to refuse to 
receive the deposit under the conditions imposed by the 
m;signment as drawn by its own counsel, and as imposed 
under the terms of the letter of transmittal and under 
the terms of the endorsement which it was required to 
aeeept, but it had no right whatsoever to receive the de-
posit under those conditions and then, under highly ques-
tionable conduct1 take the money, and leave M & S and 
~teenberg to pick up the wreck. 
The fact that a part of the money was applied on a 
note that wasn't even due, part of it applied to payment 
of noh!8 held by l\Ir. Barlow and Mr. Steed personally, 
and a large part on the payment of a note that was agreed 
to he renewed under the revolving line of credit agree-
lllPnt, simply paints the picture in the true colors as to 
how far some people are willing to go in violating their 
word and in breaching a relationship of trust and confi-
(lern'P. 
Nor can they be heard to say that they did not know 
01· folly appreciate the dire consequences of their conduct. 
'l'lwi r eounsel had studied the Steenberg contract, and 
11a:,.; present at the final decision to dishonor the checks, 
and the Bank was fully informed as to what would occur 
if they did as they said. The Bank had drawn the assign-
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ments and chattel rnortgagt>s under which the Bank had 
gathered in every vestige of resources M & S had. M & S 
had nothing else to offer to any other financing agency. 
When they dishonored those payroll checks, they pulled 
tho whole structure down and the jury was most con-
siderate in assessing the damages as low as it did. 
\Ve submit the following authorities that deny the 
right of the bank to do that : 
7 Am .• J ur. 298, Banks, Sec. 424 - "Deposits for 
Special Purposes - Deposits of funds for a spe-
eial purpose, such as for the purpose of paying 
such funds to a third perion upon the presentation 
of certain papers or instruments of title; paying 
hands or the interest thereon as such obligation 
matures; paying a mortgage indebtedness; meet-
ing certain checks or classes of checks; taking up 
the depositor's note that has been indorsed to an-
other bank; transmitting such funds to another 
at a distant place; paying a contractor for work 
being performed by him; holding such money in 
escrow, to be returned to the vendee if title is found 
defective, and to bt> paid to the vendor if title is 
approved; furnishing collateral security to the 
bank, etc., have all the attributes of special dt>-
posits and are gt>ncrally termed and constructed 
as such. 1-'lw bank becomes a bailee of the deposit, 
as in tlH~ ordinary case of a special deposit, in so 
far as the rett>ntion of the deposit is concerned; 
beyond such function, and in addition thereto, the 
hank has also the fiduciary duty of an agent to 
apply the deposit to the particular purpose for 
which it was delivered to the bank, and in case of 
the misapplication of the deposit, it may be fol-
lowed on tlw trnst fund theory." 
Fi'i11dli11per I'. flq)(frtment, 210 Ind. 83, 199 N.E. 
/lfi. ReP anuotntion 105 A.L.R. 516. 
Where there is a deposit in a bank for the purpose 
of meeting certain checks or classes of checks, it is gen-
Prally held that the money thus deposited must be ap-
plied to the purpose for which it was deposited. It cannot 
be diverted by the bank therefrom. Morton v. Woolery 
48 N.D. 1132, 189 N.W. 232. Seen annotation 24 A.L.R. 
1111; Payne v. Burnett, 151 Tn. 496, 269 S.W. 27. See 
annotation 39 A.L.R. 1138; Re Warren's Bank, 209 Wis. 
121, 244 N.W. 594, 86 A.L.R. 371. See annotation at 
page 375. 
Zions Savings Bank v. Rouse, 86 Ut. 574, 47 P.2d 617: 
''The right of a bank to apply a depositor's funds, 
held by it, to payment of his indebtedness, can 
exist only where each occupies the position of 
debtor and creditor, and where there exists mutual 
demands. 5 Michie, Banks and Banking, 218. The 
debt owing by the depositor must have matured. 
5 Michie, Banks and Banking, 216. Both maturity 
and mutuality are essential to the validity of a 
setoff." 
The relationship of debtor and creditor is entirely 
different from the trust relationship existing here as to 
tlu-• nature of the fund as a deposit for a special purpose 
and also as to its status as collateral under the assign-
nwnt. 
'l'he doctrine was reaffirmed by our Supreme Court 
in Seaboard Finance v. Shire, 117 Ut. 546, 218 P.2d 282. 
The most recent consideration of the subject is con-
ta iiwd in National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State 
flank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W. 2d 528; as annotated in 8 
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A.L.R. :1rd 229, ~with thP following heading listing cases 
from almost every state in the Union at p. 339: 
"It has universally been held that knowledgP 
upon the part of a hank that deposits made by a 
dl'lltor in his own na11w belong to a third person 
absolutely precludPs the hank from applying such 
funds to the individual indebtedness of the de-
positor to it." 
See also Moore Jlill & Lumber Co. v. Cnrry Cou1Ytty 
Bank, 200 Ore. 558, 267 P.2d 202, quoting with approval 9 
C .• J .S., Banks and Banking, Sec. 275, page 570, as follows: 
"* * * A specific deposit, or deposit for a 
specific purpose, consists in the delivery of money 
or property to a bank for application to a desig-
nated object or a defined purpose, as in the case 
of money deposited to meet a maturing obligation 
or a note delivered for collection. While such a 
deposit has hPen referred to as 'special,' and by 
other authority has been termed general in char-
aeter, strictly speaking it is neither general nor 
wholly spPcial, but constitutes a distinct class of 
deposits. 
"A 'specific' de1Josit partakes of tlw nature of 
a 'special' deposit to the extent that title to thP 
thing derlOsited remains in the depositor and does 
not })ass to the bank, unless and until applied to 
the speeifiPd purpose, that no relation of debt?r 
and creditor is created between bank and deposit-
or, and that the hank becomes the depositor's 
agent, hailPP, or trusteP. * * *" 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE BANK ON ITS COUN-
TERCLAIMS AND CROSS COMPLAINT WHEN THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE NOTES WERE 
SECURED AND THE BANK HAD DESTROYED ITS 
SECURITY IN AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE 
AMOUNT OF THE NOTES. 
Additional defendant Y ern l\I. Smith has appealed, 
along ~with Plaintiff, from the judgment entered by the 
Court in the first and second causes of action of its 
<'OUnkrclaims, and against plaintiff on its third and 
fourth causes of action; and against additional defendant 
Vern M. Smith on its first cause of action in its cross 
<·0111vlaint. 
Tiw uncontradicted evidence shows that these alleged 
cansl'S of action were secured by the assignment, Exhibit 
.. B," and that pursuant to that assignment defendant held 
a:o :c:ecurity all of the right of plaintiff to receive from 
~tP<:>nherg payment for its October, 1963 estimate, plus 
tht> 10% retained on prior estimates, plus the additional 
claim for additional work on the core trench, in addition 
to its estimated profits on the job, all as referred to by 
:.Ir. Pritchett (R. 87). This security was placed by the 
assigm1wnt in the name of the Bank to be held by it as 
<'ollateral s<:>curity, and it had the exclusive right to have 
an<l n~ceive the same. It stands before this Court as 
l1aving Pither intentionally or negligently destroyed that 
c:(•<·nrity by its improper action. 
'rhP jury found the lost security to have been worth 
$1 :J(),0()0 for loss of profits alone. The defendant was not 
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entitled to recover a personal judgment against any of 
the parties on this phase of the record regardless of either 
of the other questions presented. 
A pledgee of property or property rights, to be held 
as collateral security must use reasonable care to protect 
the property or property right pledged and is liable for 
either intentional or negligent loss or damage to the se-
curity. See 41 Am. Jur. 619, Sec. 49 of Pledge and Col-
lateral Security and Restatement of the Law, "Security," 
Sec. 17, as to duty of pledgee with reference to pledged 
security. See note on liability of Bank for loss or damage 
to pledgee 's property. 68 A.L.R. 2d, 1262, Sec. 4; 72 
C.J.S. 5, Sec. 2, under "Pledges." 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury was right in its verdict; the Trial Judge 
erroneously granted the motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict; and erroneously granted judgment 
to defendant Bank on the counterclaim and cross com-
plaint for amounts represented by notes secured by the 
assignment of funds to be received from Steenberg. 
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